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Injunction-Employee's Agreement Not to Compete-
Partial Performance
Defendant agreed at the time of employment as route salesman for
plaintiff's beauty parlor- supply company in North and South Caro-
lina, that for a period of. five years from any termination thereof, he
Would not own or operate any business selling the same type of mer-
chandise, or contact any account handling such merchandise, in either
North or South Carolina. Upon defendant's termination of employment
he immediately accepted employment with a competitor of plaintiff and
approached customers in eastern North Carolina that he had previously
called on for plaintiff. On appeal by plaintiff from a judgment dis-
solving a temporary restraining order, held: affirmed. Since plaintiff
had operated a business only in eastern North Carolina, the contract
restriction against competition in North and South Carolina was un-
reasonable and void as against public policy."
Where the interest of the employer sought to be protected is an
appropriate one, North Carolina will enforce employees' restrictive
covenants not to compete if founded on "valuable considerations and
. . necessary to protect the interests of the party in whose favor they
are imposed, and do not unduly prejudice the public interest."'2 "To
this must be added the condition that they do not impose unreasonable
hardship on the covenantor. . . ." Except for the territorial aspect,
the instant case seems to be one where injunction normally would issue,
The employee's promise was given in consideration of an original con-
tract of employment.4 The employee had a personal association with
plaintiff's customers which, when his employment terminated, would
enable him to injure the business of plaintiff if employed by a com-
petitor.5 And the five year term of the restriction has been held
reasonable. 6
In the light of other North Carolina decisions, if the covenant in the
instant case had covered only the named cities or counties within which
plaintiff did business, an injunction probably would have been
granted. 7 The court's justification for denying injunction in the princi-
Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N. C. 242, 45 S. E. 2d 121 (1947).
'Kadis v. Britt, 224 N. C. 154, 160, 29 S. E. 2d 543, 547 (1944) (while this
case states the general rule followed in North Carolina in previous cases, the
court held that the facts of the case did not justify enforcement of the restriction).
' Kadis v. Britt, 224 N. C. 154, 161, 29 S. E. 2d 543, 547 (1944) (this seems
to be the first case in which the North Carolina court expressly adds this con-
dition to the general rule).
4Id. at 163, 29 S. E. 2d at 548.
'Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg. 199 N. C. 539, 545, 155 S. E. 154, 157 (1930).
'Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N. C. 670. 93 S. E. 2d 476 (1940).
Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N. C. 387, 42 S. E. 2d 352 (1947) (forty-
nine counties); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 227 N. C. 96, 40 S. E. 2d
696 (1946) (city of Winston-Salem and thirteen counties); Beam v. Rutledge,
217 N. C. 670. 9 S. E. 2d 476 (1940) (city of Lumberton and 100 miles there-
from) ; Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 199 N. C. 539, 155 S. E. 154 (1930) (city
of High Point and a fifteen mile radius).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
pal case was that "The Court cannot by splitting up the territory make
a new contract for the parties-it must stand or fall integrally."8
Where the territory embraced in restrictive covenants is unreason-
able, but is expressed in divisible terms, i.e., in terms of local geo-
graphical or governmental units, the majority of the courts enforce
the covenant in as many of the units as are reasonable and disregard
the remainder. 9 To some extent, the North Carolina case of Sonotone
Corp. v. Baldwin'0 takes this view. There, the employee's territory
included forty-nine counties, but the restricted territory included the
same counties plus an area fifty miles wide on every side of those
counties. The injunction included only the forty-nine counties, but
with no mention of the fifty mile strip.
Where the territory is unreasonable but is not described in separable
local units, the majority view has been that the entire territorial re-
striction is void." The minority view, however, favors enforcement
of the restriction in as much of the territory as is shown to be rea-
sonable, even at the administrative cost of newly defining the smaller
area, and the tendency of the American cases is toward this view.' 2
A case adopting this view is Nezu England Tree Expert Co. v. Rus-
sell.13 Defendant was a salesman of arboricultural services, including
tree surgery and landscaping, under an express covenant not to com-
pete in the New England states after the termination of employment.
Plaintiff's business was concentrated in Rhode Island, and in parts of
Connecticut and Massachusetts; defendant's sales territory was confined
to a part of Massachusetts. Upon defendant's resignation, he estab-
lished a competitive business in his original sales territory. The court
granted an injunction as to the original sales territory and the remainder
of the territory intensively covered by plaintiff's solicitors. In affirm-
ing the injunction the court said, "The defendant is bound by his
covenant to the extent necessary for the protection of the good will
of the plaintiff's business."'14 Another illustration is a Texas case
where defendant was given sixty-six counties, including the city of
Fort Worth, as his territory for the sale of adding machines, with a
covenant not to compete in this territory for a period of one year from
the termination of 'his employment. Defendant actually sold only in
Fort Worth, and upon termination of his employment, he undertook to
8 Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N. C. 242, 245, 45 S. E. 2d 121, 123 (1947).
*5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1659 (Rev. ed. 1937 and 1947 cum. supp.).
10227 N. C. 387, 42 S. E. 2d 352 (1947).
115 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1660 (Rev. ed. 1937 and 1947 cum. supp.), and
cases cited; Automobile Club v. Zubrin, 127 N. J. Eq. 202, 12 A. 2d 369 (Ch.
1940).
1IS WILLISTOs, CoNmAcrs §1660 (Rev. ed. 1937 and 1947 cum. supp.).
" 306 Mass. 504, 28 N. E. 2d 997 (1940).
" Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926) (covenant as
to state of Massachusetts unreasonable, but reasonable and enforceable in city
of Boston).
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sell a competitive line ii Fort Worth. The Texas court in granting an
injunction for Fort Worth only said, "An injunction on these facts for
all sixty-six counties would be unreasonable, . . . the court may limit
an injunction to the territory within which defendant's employment
has given him an aquaintance with plaintiff's business."'1
This view seems to reach much the better result. It has the merit of
protecting the employer's interest without an undue burden on the
employee. This is not the making of a new contract by the court, but
is an equitable limitation on the extent to which the remedy of injunc-
tion will be used to enforce the contract as written. See Sonotone
Corp. v, Baldwin, supra.
The differences between the courts' decisions in these cases seem
to depend more upon the form than upon the substance of the restric-
tive agreement. The reason most often advanced against partial en-
forcement of indivisible employee covenants is that it encourages em-
ployers with superior bargaining power to insist on unreasonable and
excessive restrictions knowing that they will get at least a part if not all
of what they seek.1 6 This argument loses most if not all of its validity
when it is considered that the employer by skilful wording of a cove-
nant can obtain the same result by describing the same territory in
terms of separable local units.
At least six state courts today grant partial performance of em-
ployee agreements not to compete, even though the territory was de-
scribed in the agreement as an apparently indivisible area. 17 Two
Federal courts are in accord.1 8
"
5Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Chollar, 79 S. W. 2d 344 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935).
165 WiLLIsToN, CONTRAcrs 4685 (Rev. ed. 1937).
'ANew England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E. 2d 997
(1940); Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Chollar, 79 S. W. 2d 344 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935); Edwards v. Mullin, 220 Cal. 379, 30 P. 2d 997 (1934) (where
statute limits restriction to one county or part thereof); Davey Tree Expert
Co. v. Ackelbein, 233 Ky. 115, 25 S. W. 2d 62 (1930); Edgecomb v. Edmonston,
257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926); cf. American Weekly v. Patterson, 179 Md.
109, 16 A. 2d 912 (1940) ; General Paint Co. v. Seymour, 124 Cal. App. 611, 12
P. 2d 990 (1932) ; Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., 37 F. 2d 451 (C. C.
A. 5th 1930) ; J. L. Davis, Inc. v. Christopher, 219 Ala. 346, 122 So. 406 (1929) ;
Moore & Handley v. Towers, 87 Ala. 207, 6 So. 41 (1889) (both Alabama cases
involve restrictions on vendors with no limitations as to territory set out. The
court construed the territory as the previous area of competition and held this
to be reasonable.).
"
8Cropper v. Davis, 243 F. 310 (C. C. A. 8th 1917) (a Nebraska case hold-
ing where the territory is unlimited but the territory where a, similar business
would be in competition with plaintiff can be ascertained, the contract will be
limited to that territory) ; cf. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F. 2d 112 (N. Y.
1931) ("Full effect may be given to the restrictive covenant by construing
it as covering the same places where the defendant was then carrying on his
business in New Jersey and New York. This construction has the merit that
it makes the agreement valid, and as between two possible constructions, one
rendering it valid and the other rendering it void, the courts will adopt the one
rendering it valid.").
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It is submitted that in the instant case the court, would have adopted
the better view and followed the modern trend had it upheld the cove-
nant as far as it was shown to be reasonable, namely, eastern North
Carolina, and thus given the employer the protection needed.
MARTIN B. SImPsoN, JR.
Mortgages-Absolute Deeds--Binding as Against the
Grantor (Mortgagor); Void as Against Creditors
Courts throughout the United States recognize that a deed, although
absolute in form, upon proper proof will be considered a mortgage.'
Courts differ, however, in determining what constitutes proper proof.
Apparently North Carolina is the only state requiring proof of some
general ground of equitable relief before parol evidence will be ad-,
mitted to show that the deed, although absolute in form, was in fact
intended as a mortgage. 2 All other states seem to have abandoned this
strict view and will permit reformation if there is sufficient parol proof
of the intent to establish a security.3 The standard statement of the
North Carolina court is that two things must be proved, "1. It must
appear that the clause of redemption was omitted through ignorance,
mistake, fraud, or undue advantage. 2. The intention [to create a se-
curity] must be established, not by simple declarations of the parties,
but by proof of facts and circumstances dehors the deed, inconsistent
with the idea of an absolute purchase .... -4 It is also a general re-
quirement that the proof be clear, cogent, strong, and convincing.
The most recent statement of this proposition is in Posten v. Bowen5
where the relation of employer-employee was not considered sufficient
in itself to constitute undue advantage6 in the ommission of the clause
of redemption. As a result the grantor was non-suited.
This conservative view would seem to be based upon our court's
almost unswerving adherence to the parol evidence rule and the land
contract section of the Statute of Frauds.7 The court feels that to
allow parol proof of the security intent without first finding general
1 See Note, L.R.A. 1916B 18 for an extensive analysis of the broad proposi-
tion and applicable cases from all jurisdictions; Note, 16 N. C. L REv. 416
(1938) discusses the North Carolina view.
'Note, L.R.A. 1916B 18, 47; 1 JONEs, MORTGAGES §375 (8th ed. 1928),
'Notes, 155 A.L.R. 1104 (1945); 79 A.L.R. 937 (1932).
'E.g., Davenport v. Phelps, 215 N. C. 326, 1 S.E. 2d 824 (1939); Newbern
v. Newbern, 178 N. C. 3, 100 S.E. 77 (1919); Frazier v. Frazier, 129 N. C.
30, 39 S.E. 634 (1901); Watkins v. Williams, 123 N. C. 170, 31 S. E. 388
(1898); Sprague v. Bond, 115 N. C. 530, 20 S.E. 709 (1894); Kelly v. Bryan,
41 N. C. 283 (1849); Streator v. Jones, 10 N. C. 433 (1824) (dissent). For a
more exhaustive list see Note, 16 N. C. L. Rav. 416 (1938).
5228 N. C. 202, 44 S.E. 2d 881 (1947).
'Variously referred to as undue influence, oppression, or advantage taken
of grantor's necessities.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-2 (1943).
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